A detailed discussion with Lt. Adams following his return to Ladd Field led to the opinion that landfall was made at Ellesmere Island in the vicinity of 88 degrees 00' N, 64 degrees 00' W, on an approximate true heading of 180 degrees. This opinion is borne out by several factors.

Lt. Adams stated that to the best of his recollection the coast line came in on the right side of the scope, on a line roughly 165 degrees relative bearing to the heading, and after a short distance appeared to turn 90 degrees to the right. This turn could have been Robeson Channel. Lt. Adams further stated that after a 180 degree turn had been made to follow the coast line, mountainous returns were secured for 50 miles inland, arranged roughly in a series of ranges parallel to the coast line. The mountains appeared to rise abruptly from the coast line on the radar scope. This impression was confirmed visually by Lt. Adams and other crew members.

The northern part of Ellesmere Island is the only area in the Canadian Archipelago that fits the description in the preceding paragraph. Several of the islands are low and flat, giving a negative return in comparison to the surrounding ice. Others, including Deven Island, the Ellef Ringers Group, and Axel Heiburg Island have isolated mountains or mountain ranges, But in no case do they have a continuous mountainous area fifty miles wide. Ellesmere Island is also the only one on which a series of parallel ranges is found.

On the Radar Observer's report, it is stated that after turning inland 90 degrees to the coast, the aircraft passed over large fiords, some of which were so long they appeared to separate the land into islands. These could possibly have been Nansen Sound, Greely Fiord and/or Eureka Sound. The aircraft's path could have crossed Ellesmere in the vicinity of Greely Fiord, emerging on Kane Basin or Smith Sound. This would tie in with the position at which the crash landing was made. Radar pictures taken by the first search aircraft to reach the scene were viewed by Lt. Adams. The route followed by this aircraft lay across Ellesmere near the path suggested above, and Lt. Adams stated that the pictures appeared to him to be exactly the same type of terrain he observed on the scope in 1768 prior to the crash landing.

In view of the above mentioned facts, it is the conclusion of the writer that landfall was made on the point of Ellesmere Island set forth above, and that the succeeding five hours flight was spent around and over this island, finally crossing Kennedy Channel and ending on Greenland.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the radar observers assigned to Project 14 are familiar with the terrain of the Canadian Archipelago, and it is the writer's considered opinion that any of them would have been able to identify the island within a short time after landfall. Due to the high classification of Project 8, however, the radar observers assigned to this flight had been restricted to their project. Personnel cleared on Project 8 were kept to a minimum, which precluded their use on other projects. The shortage of experienced radar observers was also a contributing factor. At that time only eight observers in the squadron were qualified for Arctic operations, four of whom were assigned to Project 5 and four to Project 14. Five replacement observers were being checked out by experienced men on Project 14, but had not had sufficient orientation to be cleared. In the future all radar observers will be interchanged on flights on all projects, so that each of them will be familiar with all terrain covered by the squadron. This should eliminate difficulty in identifying any particular area in the future.

Emergency map kits covering the entire Project 14 area, including the coastline of Alaska and the Canadian mainland, have been carried by members of "F" Flight on all missions. One of these was utilized by the crew of the first search aircraft, since the flight was originally planned only as far as the Canadian coast. and charts were prepared for this area only. Similar emergency kits have been available for several months for Project 5 crews, but it is understood one was not carried by the crew of the Kee Bird. It is usually the navigator's responsibility to secure the kit.

In the matter of the difficulty of taking wind runs over solid ice, this condition had been frequently encountered. The condition is greatly aggravated when snow, rain, ice haze, or a heavy undercast exists below the aircraft. The presence of any of these items interfere with radar returns and tends to blank out the open leads, etc., usually used for wind run targets giving the appearance on the scope of solid ice below the aircraft. On this flight moderate rime icing was encountered during the climb through the overcast, so it is believed the undercast contained enough moisture in either vapor or crystalline form, to give the interference mentioned above. There is little that can be done under such circumstances to secure an accurate wind.

A fairly accurate drift can be ascertained, however, by the method employed by Lt. Adams on this mission. With the scope on the four mile range, the grid can be roughly aligned with the returns, giving the track of the aircraft. Targets can be utilized for this purpose which would be inadequate for a conventional wind run. In the absence of any definite targets, i.e., open leads or holes, an "impression" drift can sometimes be secured, similar to the one of the B-5 driftmeter over the open sea where no whitecaps are present, by watching the general pattern of the return as it passes through the scope. This method requires considerable practice for accurate results. It is the intention of the Radar Section to require each observer to become proficient in this method to the point where the radar drift so obtained coincides within one degree of simultaneous visual drifts secured by the navigator with the B-3 driftmeter.

SUPPLEMENT TO RADAR ANALYSIS

It should be pointed out that the radar emergency equipment now installed in the squadron aircraft is inadequate for Arctic operations. The radar corner reflectors were used by Lt. Adams, who placed them at four evenly spaced intervals around the aircraft, one of each wing-tip, one at the nose and the other at the tail. The reflectors were placed a short distance from the aircraft to give the maximum return on a radar scope. However, due to the roughness of the terrain in the immediate vicinity, the energy return from the reflectors and the aircraft itself, if any, could not be distinguished from the ground return.

The CFT-2 radar beacon was turned on when search aircraft were in the vicinity, but the first aircraft was not equipped with a SCR-729 receiver, so no check could be made. The second aircraft, piloted by Captain Allenby, was equipped, but no signals could be received, even when approaching the crashed aircraft visually. The CFT-2 is a battery- Operated instrument, and it is a known fact that the efficiency of batteries in extremely cold temperatures is low, and of very short duration. This was demonstrated by the 46th Radar Maintenance Section, when a maximum of two hours operation was secured at temperatures of -40 degrees Centigrade on ground tests. There was no way of testing the beacon used by Lt. Adams to see if the transmitter was working. It is further recommended that a neon bulb be included in the emergency kit to test whether the beacon is transmitting. It is further recommended that several spare batteries be included as replacements. At present, no spares are in the kits.

In conclusion, it is believed tat the Radar Observer on 1768 did as well as could be expected with the information and materials at hand. In the future, it is believed the radar observers will be better prepared, should a similar emergency arise, because of the orientation project now in progress.