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Narrative Report of Rescue B-29 Survivors in Greenland

ARMY AIR FORCES
HEADQUARTERS, ATLANTIC DIVISION
AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND
FORT TOTTEN, LONG ISLAND, NEW YORK

In reply refer
ATLD 370 12 18 Apr 1947

Subject: Narrative Report of Rescue B-29 Survivors in Greenland

THRU:   Commanding General
             Air Transport Command
             Washington 25, D.C.

TO:       Commanding General
             Army Air Forces
             Washington 25, D.C.

At approximately 1900Z, 22 February 1947, Headquarters, Air Transport Command notified General Turner, Commanding General, Atlantic Division, that a Strategic Air Command B-29 very long reconnaissance aircraft had made a crash landing at Daugaard-Jensen's Land, Greenland, at position 80 degrees north 61 degrees west, approximately 280 miles north of Thule, Greenland. This was the first information received by the Atlantic Division and plans were made to give every possible assistance.

General Turner immediately called a meeting of the Staff who discussed the situation. and determined the plan of action. A tentative (alert) Search and Rescue plan was devised. The Commanding General of Newfoundland Base Command was notified of the situation and plan of operation. by telephone.

The plan of operation was confirmed by teletype to Newfoundland Base Command and all base units in Newfoundland and Greenland Base Command areas. The plan was essentially as follows:

The loan of an R-6 helicopter and crew was requested by Headquarters ATLD from the Eastern Area Coast Guard to be flown from Elisabeth City, North Carolina to Goose Bay, Labrador by a C-54 special mission from Westover Field to Goose Bay and to remain at Goose Bay awaiting further instructions. The Air Rescue helicopter at Westover Field was not requested because the Coast Guard helicopter was already disassembled and ready to load aboard a C-54. It would require a minimum of eight (8) to (ten) hours to disassemble the Air Rescue Service helicopter. Due to the large size of the R-5, it is difficult to load on a C-54. At the time, a C-82 on which an R-5 helicopter can readily be loaded, was not readily available.
Two (2) C-54 Nanook aircraft were alerted for immediate departure from Westover to Thule. Lt Cavnar was to pilot the first aircraft and to proceed directly to Thule via Goose Bay with whatever survival equipment and Arctic kits were available at Westover and pick up any additional equipment at Goose Bay flown there from Stephenville by Newfoundland Base Command aircraft. Lt Cavnar was then to proceed direct to Thule and from there to the scene of the crash and search until contact was established. Radio frequencies of the B-29 aircraft were to be furnished to Lt Cavnar as soon as they became available. When contact with the downed B-29 was established, Lt Cavnar was to airdrop such survival equipment as he had available. Lt Cavnar was then to return to Thule for such additional supplies as required to be air dropped.
The second Nanook aircraft was to load Arctic kits at Westover, proceed to Goose Bay, and then proceed to Thule and assist the first aircraft in shuttling between Westover, and to assist the first aircraft by shuttling between Westover. Goose Bay, BW-1, BW-8 and Thule for the purpose of laying down Arctic kits, survival equipment and supplies that may be needed to aid in the rescue of the B-29 crew.
The Commanding General, Newfoundland Base Command, was placed in full charge of the Air Transport Command rescue activities and was made responsible for the proper coordination and expeditious action and specifically directed to move

12 Reindeer sleeping Bags
12 E-2 Arctic Kits
12 A-2 Self-inflated Mattresses
6 D-1 Special Arctic Tents
6 D-1 Medical
6 D-1 clothing
6 Radius or Primus Stoves, with Greenland Base Command instructions for use.
12 Six Piece Arctic Suits (Complete)
12 Pairs of Mukluks

Newfoundland Base Command was directed to make maxiadquarters, Atlantic Division that no suitable surface existed for landing ski- equipped aircraft at BW-8 or Thule The fjord at BW-8 had eighteen (18) inches of snow with cracks. Lake Fergueson, four (4) miles south of the field, had five (5) feet of ice le for emergency landing only as the lake was rough with pressure ridges. Newfoundland Base Command had directed the Commanding Officer at Crystal 11 to hold ski- equipped there upon arrival, pending further instructions. Lt Cavnar overflew Goose Bay due to weather and requested permission to proceed to Thule and set up a landing strip for ski-equipped aircraft.
When weather had raised sufficiently at Goose Bay, the C-54 carrying the helicopter and crew and the second C-54 with the additional equipment for the helicopter, departed for Goose Bay.
When Lt Cavnar landed at BW-8 and picked up survival equipment which had been flown to BW-1 and then proceeded to Thule. Lt Pope, BW-8 Medical Officer, was included as a member of the crew.
En route from Westover to Goose Bay, Lt Cavnar, Captain Shaw and Captain Dorsey thoroughly discussed the best method of rescue. From their experience and knowledge of the Northern Area, they knew the following conditions should exist at the scene of the downed airplane:

There were fresh water lakes in the vicinity of the downed aircraft.
The ice would be sufficient to support a C-54 and should be smooth enough for landing.
The snow should not exceed ten (10) inches as there had been very little precipitation in that area and the snow would not exceed ten (10) inches unless excessive snow had been blown off the ice cap unto the lake.
C-54 could land and take of in up to ten (10) inches of snow.
The really only unknown factor would be the approaches for landing and take off from the lake, and this was to determined by making low passes over the lake.

After satisfying themselves that it was practical to make the rescue by landing the C-54 upon the lake, a request to make the landing was radioed to General Haynes who was then at Goose Bay. General Haynes gave permission to attempt the rescue if their assumption could be substantiated and no factor was left to chance.
In the meantime, the crew of the downed B-29 had contacted BW-8 and stated that the ski-equipped C-47 could be used only in an emergency and recommended the use of B-17 with the heavy load in the tail to prevent nosing over. Captain Shaw made necessary arrangements for the use of dog teams to effect the rescue, if required, by radio telephone while overflying Goose Bay. En route from BW-8, the B-29 was contacted and it was discovered that the B-29 was actually on the lake where it was planned to land the C-54. A mistake of one (1) degrees longitude had been made in reporting the plane's position. The mistake was discovered when the pilot of the B-29 reported that the plane was on the lake. Further information from the B-29 indicated the snow on the lake was smooth-rolling snow drifts varying from two (2) to ten (10) inches in depth with a hard wind crust top, as predicted by Captain Dorsey.
Lt Cavnar landed at Thule 0131Z 24 February. Further discussions were held with Mr. Edward Goodale, an Arctic Specialist, who is the officer in charge of the U.S. Weather Bureau Station at Thule. He concurred in the established plan and willingly agreed to accompany the C-54 to the scene to assist if anything went wrong. He also supplied the necessary shovels in the event they were needed to clear a runway for take-off after landing. The take off was planned for the following morning about 09:30 local time in order to arrive at the scene at high noon when the light would be best. (At that latitude and time of the year, the sun does not appear above the horizon.) At Thule the sun appeared above the horizon for the first time this year on February 24.
Previous to take-off, Captain Shaw showed Lt Cavnar all types and depths of snow that would be encountered at the scene in order to make him familiar with landing surface conditions, Take-off from Thule was made at 1410Z. The B-29 was easily located due to the fact that the B-29 crew had built a fire of engine oil and rubber rafts which threw off a column of black smoke. Lt Cavnar made two (2) passes over the scene and then landed with very little difficulty at 1543Z. He then taxied up and down to break out a take-off runway. Upon completion of this, all non-essential equipment not required for the flight was removed from the C-54. The engineers connected the electrical fasteners on the on the four (4) jato bottles which had been fastened on in Thule and the survivors were taken aboard. The pilot of the B-29 had already destroyed all classified material and equipment by burning and smashing with an ax. In the take-off from the lake, the aircraft started to slide. The brakes were then released and using fourteen (14) degrees of flaps reached a speed of approximately fifty (50) miles per hour whereupon twenty (20) degrees of flaps were used and the jato bottles fired. to leap into the air. It is estimated that the plane grossed approximately 66.000 pounds, and was off of the ground with approximately an eight hundred (800) foot run. After take-off, Lt Pope, Medical Officer from BW-8, examined the survivors but found no frozen parts but did find mild cases of shock and exposure, Upon arrival at Thule, the crew was fed a steak dinner by Mr. Goodale. After that, all survivors stretched out on sleeping bags and kapok mattresses, and slept as much as possible during the long flight. Suitable accommodations were not available at Thule to rest survivors at that station. It was necessary for Lt Pope to administer sleeping pills as the survivors were restless and nervous. The flight from Thule to Westover was made non-stop without further incident.
When Lt Cavnar departed BW-8 on his way to Thule, the Newfoundland Base Command from BW-1 which had carried the survival equipment to BW-8 was directed to stand by ready to make air drops of rescue and survival equipment of necessary.

The following factors brought about the decision to evacuate the B-29 survivors by C-54 aircraft:

The helicopter would be inadequate due to insufficient range. it would be necessary to land and refuel at least once each way between Thule and the scene of the crash. It would be necessary to air drop fuel for refueling the helicopter. The helicopter could evacuate only one (1) person each trip, which would necessitate a total of eleven (11) round trips.
The use of dog teams would require a five hundred (500) mile or more trip or the transportation of the dog team by air and a landing at the best and nearest natural landing area available.
The need for fast action was considered necessary inasmuch as previous to the B-29 crash, the region had experienced one (1) of the longest periods of good weather conditions in several years and bad weather was anticipated at most any time.
In view of the length of time it would take a ski-equipped aircraft or glider-towed aircraft to reach Thule from Alaska and the fact that the survivors recommended a B-17 wheel landing in preference to the ski-equipped aircraft, the C-54 would be the first to reach the scene and more suitable than a B-17 to make the landing.
The combination of an experienced Arctic pilot, a highly specialized Arctic weather forecaster, a thoroughly experienced Arctic rescue specialist and a medical officer provided the experience and knowledge to foresee and prepare for any eventuality that might be encountered in attempting a landing and take-off from the scene of the crash.
Previous to the carrying out of the rescue, the following preparations were made in anticipation of any mishap:

Sufficient food, clothing, neat (sic) and shelter were carried by the C-54 to provide adequate survival for the crews of the B-29 and C-54 for at least thirty (30) days and with maximum rationing for sixty (60) days.
A C-54 was ordered to stand by at BW-8 with all types of survival equipment to fly to the scene and drop if needed.
A tentative route for travel on foot to the nearest native village (Etah) through the use of air-dropped skis, dogs and sled was planned as a last resort in the event that a C-54 or other aircraft could not accompany the mission.

The factual knowledge of the mechanical properties of fresh and sea ice were known by the Arctic rescue specialist who had made observations on the growth and deterioration of ice in arctic regions during the war. It was known that a minimum of thirty-six (36) inches of ice would safely support the landing of a 65.000 pound aircraft. From factual knowledge supplied by the weather observer and Mr. Goodale (Chief of Thule station) freezing conditions throughout the winter previous to the crash would freeze the ice to a minimum depth of approximately forty-eight (48) inches or clear to the bottom if the lake was shallow. Surface conditions due to the winds and precipitation should be favorable.

Summary:

1900Z - First information received by Commanding General, Atlantic Division.
1915Z - Staff assembled in General Turner's office and operational plan formulated
1930Z - General Turner telephoned General Haynes at Newfoundland Base Command and gave him tentative operational plan. General Haynes alerted all Newfoundland Base Command facilities.
2000Z - Lt Cavnar and crew alerted at Westover. Arrangements made for use of Coast Guard helicopter.
2400Z - Captain Shaw departed Fort Totten.

0800 - Nanook C-54 #2640 departed Westover Field for Thule, Greenland via Goose Bay, Labrador and BW-8, Greenland with the following crew members aboard:

Pilot - Lt Cavnar
Co-pilot - Lt. F. Sporer
Navigator - Lt W.Q. Seward
Engineer - T Sgt W. L. Huitus
Engineer - Pfc C. J. Erack
Radio Operator - T. Sgt J.H. Suffort
Arctic Weather Specialist - Captain H. Dorsey
ATLD Search and Rescue Specialist - Captain D.A.Shaw

1245Z - General Haynes and Lt Col Van Sickle proceeded to Goose Bay en route to BW-8 to direct rescue
1530Z - Permission granted by General Haynes to attempt a C-54 landing and rescue.
1911Z - #2640 arrived BW-8, Greenland.
2105Z - #2640 departed BW-8 after refueling and loading emergency equipment. (Flown in from BW- by C-54 #2477) Lt U. L. Pope, Medical Officer, was included as a member of the rescue crew.
2319Z - #2640 requested that Alaskan ski-equipped C-47 stand by upon arrival at Crystal 11.

0131Z - Arrived Thule/.
1410Z - Took off for rescue scene with Mr. E.F. Goodale (Thule Station Chief) aboard as additional rescue crew member.
1545Z - Landed on frozen lake at scene of B-29 crash landing.
1625Z - Took off from frozen lake with all survivors aboard.
1804Z - Landed at Thule. Survivors and crew given steak dinner.
2200Z - #2640 departed Thule for non-stop flight to Westover Field with all survivors and crew members aboard.

1243Z - Arrived Westover Field. The names of the crew members of the B-29 #45-2178, 46th Reconnaissance Squadron, VLT, Alaska Air Command are as follows:

lst Lt Vern H. Arnett
lst Lt R. S. Jordan
lst Lt T, Gates
lst Lt Burl (Cowan)
lst Lt H. R. Adams
1st Lt J. Lesman
2nd Lt. R. L. Luedke
M. Sgt L. Yarbrough
T. Sgt R. Leader
S. Sgt E.C. Stewa(rt)
S. Sgt P. R. McMizara (McNamara)

The names of the rescue crew of the ATC Nanook aircraft C-54 #2640 who landed at the crash scene are as follows:

lst Lt Robert Cavnar
lst Lt Fred Sporer
lst Lt William Q. Seward
T. Sgt N. L. Huitus
T. Sgt J. H, Shufford
Pfc C. J. Ersok
Captain Herbert Dorsey
Captain Donald A. Shaw
Lt. H. Pope
Mr. Edward E. Goodale

General conclusions that may be drawn from the rescue were the fact that in the polar regions during the cold periods of late winter and early spring rescues by aircraft landing on a lake or sea are feasible. However, it should not be taken for granted that this method of rescue can be established as a standard procedure. Seasonal influences on ice surfaces cannot be relied upon to be the same from year to year. The thin ice and soft surface conditions of summer and early fall season undoubtedly would not be suitable for aircraft landings. Records of ice observations throughout the year at various pints along polar or Arctic air routes would greatly aid in determining the extent that ice surfaces could be used in all types of air operations as well as rescue.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL;
S/Theodore B. Milton
THEODORE B. MILTON
Colonel. GSC
Chief of Staff

Inclosure #1

JAMES O. JENSEN, Colonel, GSO

COPY ACS/OPS/JCJ/stg

22 2200Z Feb 47

Restricted

CG, NBO, ATLD, ST JOHN, NFLND OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

CG, AAF, WASH DC
CG, ATC, WASH DC
CG, SAC, BOLLING FLD, DC

YES

INFO: NAVAL AIR STATION, ARGENTIA, NFLND; CO, 1377THE AAFBU, WESTOVER FLD. MASS
INFO; CO, 1385-1 OP LOC, BW-8, SOUNDEESTHOMOJORD, GRENLAND
INFO: CO, 1385-6 OP LOCM BW-1, PRINCE CHRISTIAN SD, GREENLAND
INFO: CO, 1383 AAFBU, NBC, GOOSE BAY, LABRADOR
INFO: CO, THULE, GREENLAND ATLD-W-B-147

THE FOLLOWING CONFIRMS TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS THIS DATE BETWEEEN GENERAL TURNER AND GENERAL HAYNES REFERENCE BAKER TWO NINE DOWN ON EXTREME NORTHWESTERN EDGE OF GREENLAND COLON IT IS REPORTED THAT BAKER TWO NINE AIRCRAFT NUMBER FOUR FIVE DASH TWO ONE SEVEN SIX EIGHT ASSIGNED TO THE FOUR SIX RECONNAISSANCE GROUP AT LADD FIELD ALASKA IS DOWN AT DAUGAARD DASH JENSENLAND APPROXIMATELY TWO THREE ZERO NAUTICAL MILES NORTH OF THULE
PD BAKER TWO NINE HAS CONVENTIAL MARKINGS OF RED TAIL AND RED WING TIPS AND HAS MADE RADIO CONTACT WITH LADD FIELD HOWEVER DETAILS ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME
PD THIS COMMAND HAS BEEN ALERTED TO GIVE EVERY ASSISTANCE WHEN CALLED UPON
PD THIS INFORMATION IS NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC
PD THE FOLLOWING ALERT PLAN IS OUTLINED AND RESPONSIBLE COMMANDS AND SLANT OR INDIVIDUALS WILL EXPEDITE ACTION AS REQUIRED COLON ONE
PD AND ROGER DASH SIX COAST GUARD HELICOPTER WILL BE FLOWN FROM ELIZABETH CITY NORTH CAROLINA IN WESTOVER CHARLIE DASH FIVE FOR AIRCRAFT NUMBER TWO SEVEN ZERO TO GOOSE BAY WITH QUALIFIED CREW AND WILL REMAIN THEREAT FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS
PD TWO
PD TWO NANOOK AIRCRAFT NUMBERS TWO FOUR NINE NINE AND TWO FOUR SIX ZERO WITH QUALIFIED CREWS INCLUDING LIEUTENANT CAVNAR WILL DEPART FROM WESTOVER IMMEDIATELY AS FOLLOWS COLON PAREN ONE NANOOK AIRCRAFT WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO THULE WITH WHATEVER SURVIVAL AND ARCTIC KITS THAT ARE AVAILABLE AT WESTOVER AND WILL PICK UP ANY ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT AT GOOSE BAY THAT HAS BEEN FLOWN INTO GOOSE BAY FROM STEPHENVILLE BY NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND CMA LOAD PERMITTING
PD THIS AIRCRAFT WILL PROCEED TO THULE CMA THEN TO PROXIMINTY OF CRASH AND SEARCH UNTIL CONTACT IS ESTABLISHED PAREN RADIO FREQUENCIES NOW BEING USED TO CONTACT BAKER TWO NINE BETWEEN LADD FIELD AND THE SCENE OF THE CRASH WILL BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY UPON RECEIPT DASH FOLLOWING ARE FREQUENCIES ASSIGNED BAKER TWO NINE AIRCRAFT COLON TWO MIKE ONE TWO SEMICOLON FOUR TWO TWO ZERO SEMICOLON THREE TWO EIGHT FIVE SEMICOLON FOUR FIVE NINE FIVE SEMICOLON AND INTERNATIONAL DISTRESS FREQUENCIES PAREN
PD AFTER BAKER TWO NINE IS LOCATED BY CHARLIE DASH FIVE FOUR CMA RADIO CONTACT HAS BEEN ESTABILISHED CMA AIR DROP HAS BEEN EFFECTED CMA NANOOK AIRCRAFT WILL RETURN TO THULE FOR ADDITIONAL AIR DROP SUPPLIES AS REQUIRED
PD PAREN BAKER PAREN THE SECOND NANOOK AIRCRAFT WILL LOAD ARCTIC KITS AT WESTOVER CMA PROCEED TO GOOSE BAY CMA +PICK UP ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT IN LIKE MANNER AND THEN PROCEED TO THULE TO ASSIST THE FIRST NANOOK AIRCRAFT BY SHUTTLING FROM BLUIE WEST EIGHT TO THULE CMA AIR DROP AND SLANT OR AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDING GENERAL NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND PAREN CHARLIE PAREN WESTOVER WILL DISPATCH ADDITIONAL SHUTLES THAT MAY BE REQUIRED TO SHUTTLE BETWEEN WESTOVER CMA GOOSE BAY CMA BLUIE WEST ONE, BLUIE WEST EIGHT CMA AND THULE FOR THE PURPOSE OF LAYING DOWN ARCTIC KUTS CMA SURVIVAL EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES THAT MAY BE NEEDED TO AID IN THE RESCUE OF THE BAKER TWO NINE CREW
PD PAREN DOG PAREN COMMANDING GENERAL NEWFOUNDLAND WILL BE IN FULL CHARGE OF ALL ABLE TARE CHARLIE RESCUE ACTIVITIES AND WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROPER COORDINATION AND EXPEDITIOUS ACTION OF ALL REQUIRED ACTION AND WILL MOVE THE FOLLOWING EQUIPMENT NOW AT BLUIE WEST ONE TI BLUIE WEST EIGHT IMMEDUATELY FOR POSSIBLE USE IN SURVIVAL OPERATIONS COLON TWELVE REINDEER SLEEPING BAGS CMA TWELVE EASY TWELVE ARCTIC EMERGENCY KITS CMA TWELVE ABLE TWO SELF INFLATING AIR MATTRESSES CMA SIX KITS DOG ONE TENT SPECIAL, ARCTIC CMA SIX KITS DOG ONE MEDICAL CMA SIX KITS DOG ONE CLOTHING CMA SIX STOVES RADIUS OR PRIMUS WITH GREENLAND BASE COMMAND INSRUCTIONS FOR USE CMA TWELVE SIX DASH PIECE ARCTIC SUITS COMPLETE CMA TWELVE PAIRS BOOTS DASH MUKLUKS CANVAS
PD THREE
PD MAXIMUM UTILIZATION WILL BE MADE OF RESCUE EQUIPMENT IN THE NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMAND AREA INCLUDING CHARLIE DASH SIX FOUR TYPE AIRCRAFT AND REQUESTS WILL BE MADE UPON THIS HEADQUAR- TERS FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN FURNISHING ANY ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT CMA EQUIPMENT CMA OR SUPPLIES NEEDED IN THIS RESCUE OPERATION
PD FOUR
PD LIEUTENANT COLONEL WENDELL VAN SICKLE OF THIS HEADQUARTERS HAS BEEN ORDERED TO BLUIE WEST EIGHT TO ACT AS LIAISON OFFICER THIS HEADQUARTERS AND WILL ASSIST THE NEWFOUNDLAND BASE COMMANDER IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE
PD CAPTAIN SHAW OF THIS HEADQUARERS WILL REPORT IMMEDIATELY TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER AT GOOSE BAY TO COORDINATE UTILIZATION OF DOG TEAMS IF REQUIRED AND WILL PROCEED WITH LIEUTENANT CAVNAR IN THE FIRST NANOOK AIRCRAFT
PD FIVE
PD ONE CHARLIE DASH FOUR SEVEN AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WUITH SKIS IS NOW ENROUTE FROM LADD FELD VIA CHURCHILL DASH CRTSTAL TWO TO TULE ANDIT IS ESTIMATED THAT SEVERAL DAYS WILL BE REQUIRED BEFORE IT REACHES ITS DESTINATION PD SIX
PD DUE TO LIMITED SUPPLIES AT THULE CM ALL FOUR ENGINE AND TWO ENGINE AIRCRAFT UTILIZED IN THIS SEARCH MISSION WILL BE EQUIPPED WITH ADDITIONAL EQUIPMEN SUCH AS PUTT PUTTS CMA ENGINE COVERS, CMA INDIVIDUAL ENGINE HEATER CMA ET CETERA PD ADDITIONAL INFORMATION WILL BE FURNISHED AS RECEIVED
PD IT IS DESIRED THAT ON ALL COMMUNICATIONS DISTRIBUTION BE MADE TO ALL AGENCIES CONCERNED TO INSURE MAXIMUM COORDINATION
PD TURNER

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